The permission nobody uses
An identity is given broad permissions to resolve something urgent. The problem gets resolved; the permissions stay. An application is deployed with an administrator role 'so that it works' and nobody reviews it again. Within a year, most identities hold far more permissions than they need.
While nothing happens, it does not show. When one of those identities is compromised, the attacker inherits everything it held, not just what it used.
Assigned against used
The clouds record which actions each identity performs. Comparing what is assigned with what is used over a period (90 days, for instance) reveals the real distance:
- Permissions never used: clear candidates for removal.
- Identities with no activity: accounts that can be disabled.
- Broad permissions where a specific one would do: access to all storage when only one folder is used.
Reducing without breaking
Removing permissions is frightening, because something may stop working. It is done in steps:
- Start with the unambiguous: inactive identities and permissions unused for a long time.
- Reduce with notice: the owner is told what will be removed and when.
- Watch afterwards: if something fails for want of a permission, it shows in the logs and it is granted in a bounded way.
- Repeat on a schedule, not just once.
What governance already solves
The foundation is in other pieces of the Governance series: a single identity, roles defined once and sensitive permissions that are requested and expire on their own. Least privilege 'for real' is what you add on top: measuring the distance between assigned and used, and closing it regularly.
Identities are one door. The other, used more and more, is the software itself: what you write and, above all, what you import.
How we apply it: Cybersecurity.